Much research has focused on the deleterious effects of free-riding in public goods games, and a variety of mechanisms that suppresses cheating behavior. Here we argue that under certain conditions cheating behavior can be beneficial to the population. In a public goods game, cheaters do not pay for the cost of the public goods, yet they receive the benefit. Although this free-riding harms the entire population in the long run, the success of cheaters may aid the population when there is a common enemy that antagonizes both cooperators and cheaters. Here we study models in which an immune system antagonizes a cooperating pathogen. We investigate three population dynamics models, and determine under what conditions the presence of cheaters help defeat the immune system. The mechanism of action is that a polymorphism of cheaters and altruists optimizes the average growth rate. Our results give support for a possible synergy between cooperators and cheaters in ecological public goods games.
The sociology of microorganisms is an important and growing field of study [36] , and Furthermore there is a significant interaction between relatedness and the scale of 22 competition, with relatedness having less effect when the scale of competition is more 23 local [15] . Studies of P. aeruginosa have shown another solution, metabolic constraints 24 on social cheating. Quorum sensing can control both these public goods (extracellular 25 proteases) and private goods (cellular enzymes) [10] . Additionally, it is well known that 26 space can facilitate cooperation and coexistence of cooperators and defectors. This 27 effect has been shown in both theoretical models [31] and in experimental bacterial 28 populations [21, 30] . A review of altruism in microbial communities that explore a 29 collection of these mechanism and issue is found in [9] . 30 A variety of interesting pathogen-immune system models has been explored in the 31 literature [14, 23, 24, 27] . Here, we extend the model in [24] by the incorporation of a 32 public goods game, and interpret their model as a general host-pathogen model. We 33 explore both linear and Monod public good growth function, and adapt two other 34 canonical two-species growth models into our models that are adaptations of the logistic 35 equation [8] . Depending on the specific growth source used by the microbes, empirical 36 data either supports a linear or Monod growth rate function [26] . We find that the 37 models employing the Monod function exhibit a synergy between altruists and cheaters 38 where the public good is more efficiently used to increase the growth rate of the entire 39 population of pathogens. With this effect, the pathogens can overcome the immune 40 response of the host whereas wholly altruistic or cheating populations cannot.
41

Methods
42
Let x a and x c be the numbers of altruists and cheaters, respectively, X = x a + x c be 43 the total pathogen population, and y be the number of immune system effectors. The 44 growth rate of the cheater pathogens, r c , is the sum of the basal growth rate, β, and the 45 benefit from the public good, g(x a /X), which is a function of the proportion of the 46 population that are altruists. We explored two public good growth functions, linear (1) 47 and Monod growth (2):
where α is the maximum growth rate provided by the public good, and K α is the half 49 velocity constant. The growth rate for altruists is r a = r c − c, where c is the cost of 50 producing the public good. Let K be the carrying capacity andr = (r a x a + r c x c )/X be 51 the average rate of growth. In the absence of an immune response and other 52 complications, it is standard to describe the growth and competition of bacteria by 53 logistic dynamics [8] . Here we separately consider three models in this class: r/K 54 selection (5), weak selection (6) , and interspecific competition (7) . In r/K selection (5) , the success of one phenotype over the other is determined by 56 both the growth rates and carrying capacities. There is a trade-off between r i and K: 57 when close to the carrying capacity, K determines selection. And, when the population 58 is small, r i determines selection. In weak selection (6) , the population is limited by r i K, 59 and this trade-off does not exist. Finally, in interspecific competition (7) , the 60 phenotypes compete against one another for resources. A phenotype with a larger 61 growth rate will curtail the carrying capacity of its competitor.
62
In our model, the immune system does not differentiate between cooperating and 63 free riding pathogens, and thusẏ depends only on X. The immune system's effectors, 64 which kill foreign cells, are produced at a basal rate, σ, and die at a rate, δ. The 65 pathogen free host thus has an equilibrium y * = σ/δ. In the presence of a pathogen, the 66 production of immune agents is determined by the nonlinear activation function, 67 ρyX/(η + X), and immune agents are exhausted at a rate, µX. The immune system 68 attacks the pathogen, and reduces their number at a rate, x i y. The dynamics of this 69 system are governed by the following system of equations:
This model is based on [24] , where it was shown to agree with empirical observations. 71 Here we have generalized it to include bacteria with two kinds of social behavior. A 72 summary of the parameters, variables, and their values (from [24] ) can be found in 73 Table 1 . We have chosen the values of α, K α , and c in Table 1 to highlight the 74 synergistic behavior of cheaters and altruists, since the synergy is not present 75 throughout parameter space. 76 
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Results
77
Here we discuss the qualitative dynamics of immune system plus social and anti-social 78 bacteria, i.e. the equilibria, stability, and invariant surfaces. We follow these analyses 79 with simulation results that depict the synergy between altruists and cheaters, and the 80 effects of different parameters on this synergy.
81
At equilibrium, we haveẋ a =ẋ c , which implies that (r c − c)F a = r c F c . In all three 82 models, this reduces to r c − c = r c . Thus, assuming that c > 0, there are no polymorphic 83 pathogen equilibria. 11 and 12 are the equilibria at these monomorphic populations for 84 r/K selection and inter-specific competition, and weak selection, respectively; 85
with r a = β + g(1) − c and r c = β (note that sincer = r i in a monomorphic population 86 of phenotype i, 11 applies for both r/K selection and interspecific competition). Since 87 we assume that the public good is beneficial to the pathogens in a monomorphic 88 altruistic population, g(1) > c =⇒ r a > r c , it can be easily seen by 11 and 12 that all 89 monomorphic altruist equilibria have higher pathogen counts than their monomorphic 90 cheater counterparts. However, in a polymorphic population,
Since the growth rate for cheaters is always 92 greater than the growth rate of altruists in such a case, there are no stable 93 monomorphic altruistic equilibria.
94
The model has four fixed points: the pathogen free state, a suppressed population of 95 pathogens (i.e. corresponds to a dormant state); a very large population of pathogens 96 (i.e. bacteria take over the host); and a saddle point (i.e. the bacteria are populous, but 97 have not taken over the host). The pathogen free state is connected to the saddle via a 98 stable manifold. This stable manifold, a separatrix, divides phase space into regions 99 where the pathogens succeed and fail. The unstable manifold spirals into the suppressed 100 state on one side of the separatrix, and connects to the success state on the other side. 101 Qualitatively, this picture is the same as in [24] with the addition of the altruist 102 dimension. 103 Fig. 1 shows the regions of suppression (gray) and success (white) of pathogens for 104 all the models we study. The goal here is to check whether a certain initial population 105 of microbes (x c , x a ) succeeds in defeating the host. The line x a = X − x c (with 106 constant X) is overlaid to these plots to show whether changing the composition of the 107 population-without changing the total number of bacteria-results in a difference in 108 the fate of the disease.
109
Interestingly, in some cases we observe that population compositions with an 110 intermediate number of cheaters can place the population in the successful region, while 111 too little or too many cheaters jeopardize the population. In other words, while neither 112 pure cooperation nor pure cheating leads to success, a mixture of the two does. We 113 observe this phenomenon in bacteria growing according to the Monod law, but not for 114 linear growth. 115 We can explain this phenomenon by examining the equations for the change in the 116 total population,Ẋ, r/K selection and interspecific competition (13) , and weak 117 selection (14);
In linear growth,r = β + (α − c)x a /X, which is an increasing function with respect to 119 x a (given α > c). Thus, 13 and 14 are increasing with respect to x a . Therefore, the 120 impact of decreasing altruists in favor of cheaters is a decrease in the total population's 121 rate of growth; cheaters harm the population as a whole. However, for Monod growth, 122 we have the function
with the assumption that α/(K α + 1) > c. With respect to the proportion of altruists, 124 this function has a local maximum at Figure 1 . A mixed population of altruists and cheaters minimizes the number of pathogens required to overcome the immune system when growth from the public good behaves as a Monod function (d-f ). However, this behavior is not observed when the growth function is linear (a-c). The white and gray regions are where the pathogens overcome and are suppressed by the immune system, respectively. The black curves are the isoclines, x a = X − x c , where X = 10 in b and e, and X = 40, otherwise.
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Therefore, unlike the linear growth case, the optimal growth rate will occur in the 126 presence of cheaters when αK α /c − K α < 1.
127 Figure 2 . Comparison of success of a 5% cheater population vs. a pure altruist population for varying parameters α, K α , and c. The gray scale measures the difference between the number of pathogens required to overcome immune suppression for the 5% cheater, X, vs. pure altruist populations, X , divided by X. The curves define the envelope in which the optimal growth rate occurs for x a < 1 and the pure altruist Monod growth rate is greater than c. Where a parameter is not varied, its value is from Table 1 . (the cost of public good production). We ran simulations for populations of size X with 130 5% of the population cheaters. We incrementally increased X until the pathogens 131 succeeded. We then simulated a complete altruist population of size X = X. If this 132 6/11 population was suppressed, we increased X until it succeeded, and colored the graphs 133 by magnitude (X − X)/X. 134 Figure 3 . Comparison of varying benefits from public good growth rates (α). All curves are in decreasing order from top to bottom of the graphs with increasing α (α = 1.5, 1.75, 2, and 2.25). As α increases, the behavior of the model approaches that of linear growth, i. e. a monomorphic altruistic population is optimal with respect to the pathogens.
We observe that for sufficiently large α and small c, cheaters do not benefit the 135 population. In these cases, the public good is cheap and efficacious. However, within 136 the region where we observe cheater-altruist synergy, increasing α intensifies the 137 synergistic effect except with respect to c in interspecific competition. Figure 3 explains 138 this effect. Note the sharp drop in the separatrix in Figure 3 ; a small proportion of 139 altruists is beneficial to the pathogens. However, the remainder of the curve shows 140 malign effects of increasing the proportion of cheaters. As we increase α, this 141 phenomenon disappears, and we observe the same qualitative behavior as linear growth. 142 Figure 4 . Comparison of the separatrices of a polymorphic population of two types, altruists and cheaters, at initial condition x a /X (solid curves), and a monomorphic population with growth rate 15 (dashed curves). Below the curves, the immune system suppresses the pathogens, and above them, it does not. For low altruism, the two-type case outperforms the mixed type. And, for high altruism, the mixed type is optimal.
K α is negatively correlated with cheater success (Figure 2) . A low half velocity 143 constant implies that the marginal benefit from the public good rapidly decreases as the 144 proportion of altruists increases. As such, cheaters permit a more efficient utilization of 145 the public good in the population. In the linear growth case, this effect cannot occur 146 because the higher the proportion of altruists, the greater the total population's growth 147 7/11 rate.
148
We compared the separatrices for the Monod models of a population of the two 149 phenotypes and a population with a single phenotype with an intermediate production 150 of the public good in Figure 4 . We plotted the population size required to overcome the 151 immune system given an initial proportion of altruists x a /X for the two type case, and 152 a single type with growth rate 15. When altruism is low, the two-type population is 153 optimal for the pathogens. Conversely, when altruism is high, the mixed type 154 population is optimal. If x a /X < αK α /c − K α , then the mixed type will outcompete 155 the two type case. Since, x a /X → 0 as t → ∞ and 4 is a decreasing function from 0 to 156 αK α /c − K α in the two type case, while the growth rate of the mixed type will not 157 decrease.
158
Discussion
159
Previous studies support the hypothesis of frequency dependent selection among 160 cheaters and altruists [12, 25, 32] . Altruists are less fit in the presence of cheaters, who 161 outperform them. Further, average fitness is negatively correlated with the proportion 162 of cheaters, which reduces virulence [17, 33] . Our linear growth model qualitatively 163 matches these empirical results. Given these observations, the question arises as to how 164 altruism can be facilitated. However, less discussed, is why both cheating and altruism 165 are prevalent, which is relevant since the prevalence of cheaters may be common [13, 35] . 166 Much research has explored mechanisms by which altruism can be facilitated, yet 167 not how cheating can indirectly aide the population. Our approach was to explore how, 168 in host-pathogen ecology, if cheaters may be necessary for pathogens to overcome the 169 host's immune system. Our problem is essentially a threshold Volunteer's 170 Dilemma [2, 11] , where only if the population's public good production is sufficient, the 171 group as a whole benefits. The Volunteer's Dilemma has been studied with respect to 172 punishment [29] , shared rewards [6] , voluntary reward funds [34] , and asymmetric player 173 strength [20] . Additionally, multilevel selection can favour a polymorphism of 174 cooperators and defectors by maximizing the group donation level when the benefit 175 function is sigmoid [5] . We have shown that although cheaters out-compete altruists in 176 a mixed population, such a population can be more virulent than a pure population of 177 altruists or cheaters. This unexpected phenomenon occurs due to the Monod growth 178 nature of the public good, as in the case of iron facilitated growth in P. aeruginosa [22] . 179 The optimal total population growth rate may be at a mixed population. Although this 180 harms altruists relative to cheaters, it may permit the pathogens to resist suppression 181 by the immune system. Future work that studies the epidemiology of such a system 182 would be interesting. A mixed population is required to overcome the immune response, 183 during which the relative number of cheaters is increasing. However, if the carrying 184 capacity for altruists were to be larger than for cheaters, than at large population sizes, 185 the relative fitness advantage of cheaters may vanish. In this interplay, cheaters are r 186 selection and altruists K selection phenotypes.
187
This research did not consider associativity amongst the bacteria, which may come 188 about due to spatial effects. Future work employing associativity would be interesting, 189 since the degree of associativity may have surprising effects. For example, high 190 associativity between similar phenotypes would facilitate cooperation. However, this 191 would reduce the optimization of the growth rate that occurs with cheaters in the 192 Monod case. 
